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Constitutional Sunsetting?: Justice
O'Connor's Closing Comments in Grutter
by VIKRAM DAVID AMAR* AND EVAN CAMINKER**
Most Supreme Court watchers were unsurprised that Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor's vote proved pivotal in resolving the University of Michi-
gan affirmative action cases; indeed, Justice O'Connor has been in the ma-
jority in almost every case involving race over the past decade, and was in
the majority in each and every one of the 5-4 decisions the Court handed
down across a broad range of difficult issues last Term. Some smaller
number of observers were unsurprised that Justice O'Connor decided
(along with the four Justices who in the past have voted to allow latitude
with regard to race-based affirmative action programs) to uphold the kind
of flexible and individualistic use of race to promote a diverse student body
embodied in the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy.
Justice O'Connor had often cited Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke' fa-
vorably,2 and just two terms ago she had voted with the more "liberal" Jus-
tices in a 5-4 decision that permitted race consciousness in a voting redis-
tricting setting.3 But perhaps most were surprised by a comment Justice
O'Connor made for the Court at the end of the Grutter opinion: "We expect
that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be nec-
essary to further the interest approved today."' In this short essay, we ex-
plore that provocative sentence, and tease out some of the doctrinal and ju-
risprudential implications and connections that it might be understood to
raise.
The intended meaning of this sentence is highly ambiguous. We must
Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
Visiting Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
Dean and Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. See Akhil Reed Amar and Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 1745 (1996).
3. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
4. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).
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make clear at the outset, for the purposes of this exploratory essay, what we
are assuming Justice O'Connor meant, and why. It is possible, of course,
that she intended her remark to have no legal significance at all. She may
have been trying to express nothing more than her (and the Court's) fervent
desire that the number of minority law school candidates with top grades
and test scores would naturally increase so dramatically over the next quar-
ter century that racial diversity in all competitive law schools would exist
even if it were not pursued as a distinct admissions goal, or if it were pur-
sued only in a race-neutral way. Or, it is also possible that Justice
O'Connor was merely sending a signal to the nation's elected representa-
tives that the underrepresentation of minorities in higher education is an is-
sue that should be elevated to the top of the political agenda over the next
few decades - that this is a serious problem that needs some serious atten-
tion.
But for present purposes we want to put aside these relatively min i-
malistic readings, plausible and perhaps even likely though they are, in cr-
der briefly to explore a more jurisprudentially intriguing possibility. One
reason to question the first reading - that the demographics of the applicant
pool will improve on their own - is that many people would doubt its em-
pirical plausibility. 5 And a reason to question both of these non-legal inter-
pretations is the particular language Justice O'Connor used. She did not
say the Court "hoped" that "racial preferences" would not be needed after
25 more years; she said the Court "expected" so, a somewhat stronger ex-
pression.
A more important reason to doubt the non-legal interpretations of her
remark is that elsewhere in the Grutter opinion Justice O'Connor repeated
- in legal terms - her insistence that "race-conscious admissions policies
must be limited in time," and that "[e]nshrining a permanent justification
for racial preferences would offend [a] fundamental equal protection prin-
ciple.",6 Thus, Justice O'Connor's reference at the close of her opinion to
an expected end of race consciousness in 25 years suggests at least the pos-
sibility that she meant to do something more than express a demographic
hope or engage in political prodding. Rather, it may connote some kind of
a warning about the evolution of the law - that she (or her counterpart on a
future Court) would not vote to uphold the law school's program on the
same facts in the year 2028.
5. For example, data compiled during the Grutter litigation itself demon-
strates that the differences in LSAT performance between various racial groups,
while smaller than they once were, are still quite significant, and apparently quite
stubborn.
6. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341 (emphasis added).
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In this essay, we do not intend to defend the strong claim advanced by
Justice Thomas' separate writing in Grutter that Justice O'Connor neces-
sarily meant to impose, as a flat matter of legal doctrine, a firm 25-year
"doctrinal sunset" provision.7 It is simply too hazardous to definitively
read any specific intention into a single and potentially ambiguous line that
wraps up a majority opinion. But we'd like to underscore the notion of
such a doctrinal sunset, in part because whether or not Justice O'Connor
necessarily meant to impose one, we have both come across the same idea
expressed by others. In other words, we've heard other jurists and com-
mentators take the position that race-conscious admissions programs ought
to be deemed acceptable for a limited amount of time, but then terminated
after several more decades - whether or not they have successfully
achieved their goals. So, for ease of exposition, we ascribe this view to
Justice O'Connor from here on out, assuming she meant what Justice Tho-
mas claims she meant - that, if she were on the Court in the year 2028, she
would enjoin the same diversity-based race-conscious admissions program
she upheld in Grutter. (In order to remind the reader that we are self-
consciously making this assumption, we sometimes use "arguendo" or
"hypothesized" or similar language in referring to Justice O'Connor's
views.)
We start by noting that a constitutional requirement of a temporal limit
makes some analytic sense as applied to remedial race-conscious affirma-
tive action; at some point in time, and because of intervening causal fac-
tors, a program designed to remedy a past wrong is so far removed from
that wrong that is ceases to be a meaningful remedy. The current Court has
stressed this point not only in the contracting affirmative action cases, but
also in its recent rulings involving school desegregation. 8
But this absolute requirement that race consciousness must at some
point in time end makes much less sense if one truly embraces race con-
sciousness as a permissible way to accomplish diversity. Diversity, unlike
remedy, is a justification that is not temporally linked to past events;
whereas remedy looks to the past, diversity looks to the educational bene-
fits today and in the future. If diversity (including but not limited to racial
diversity) truly is a compelling interest - and Justice O'Connor spends a lot
of time in Grutter explaining that it is - and if individualistic race con-
sciousness is in fact a constitutionally unproblematic way to accomplish
this interest consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, then there should
7. Justice Thomas reads the majority opinion as "holding that racial discrimi-
nation in higher education admissions will be illegal in 25 years." See Grutter, 539
U.S. at 362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
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be no "requirement" that the permissible means not be employed indefi-
nitely. Thus, we suggest, one must look hard at Justice O'Connor's ap-
proach to ask: (1) Is racial diversity really a compelling interest in her
mind?; and (2) Is individualistic race consciousness really a constitution-
ally permissible means for her? If either of these questions yields a nega-
tive, or at least a qualified response, then perhaps we can begin to make
sense of our hypothesized reading of Justice O'Connor's so-called "sunset-
ting" language.
As to the first question, it seems clear to us the Justice O'Connor truly
does believe that the goal of admitting a student body that is diverse along
racial and other lines really is a compelling one. In describing and defend-
ing this goal in Grutter, Justice O'Connor, rather than wrapping her reasons
in Bakke as she does in other parts of her opinion, defends the compelling
nature of the state's interest in racial diversity in her own, significantly
broader, terms. Whereas Justice Powell tended to focus on the pedagogic
aspects of racial diversity - the way in which it enhanced the educational
process for its own sake - Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter tends to
characterize diversity more instrumentally, by focusing, in addition, on the
ways in which racial diversity in education serves the outside world. In
particular, she raises four significant points that hadn't previously been a
major part of the Court's jurisprudence of racial diversity: (1) that a racially
diverse educational environment appreciably enhances people's capacity
later to succeed in business leadership roles; (2) that a racially diverse offi-
cer corps is necessary to effective military operations, and the primary
sources for the Nation's officer corps are the service academies and elite
undergraduate schools; (3) that higher education trains people to be good
citizens and that this opportunity for civic education must be available to
people of all races for the polity to function well; and (4) that Lecause
competitive law schools in particular tend to produce legislators and
judges, these government training grounds must include people of all back-
grounds so that whichever leaders are selected have "legitimacy in the eyes
of the citizenry."9
That Justice O'Connor would stress these last two points - which fo-
cus on the political dimension of higher education ° - is not altogether sur-
prising given that she had already approved narrowly crafted race-
9. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-35.
10. In many ways the political dimension is reflected in her last three points,
since military service and leadership have often been considered by the Court as
falling within the political rights realm. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Jury Ser-
vice as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. IWv. 203, 222-41
(1995).
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conscious government action where access to legislatures was involved, in
the so-called racial redistricting cases. In that setting, Justice O'Connor's
vote has been key, as it has been in all equal protection race cases. And her
approach in that arena has been remarkably similar to Justice Powell's in
Bakke - that race may be used, but not as the "predominant" factor that
crowds out all other relevant characteristics.
When she said, for example, in Bush v. Vera,'' that government can-
not make race the "predominant" factor to the exclusion of all other "tradi-
tional districting criteria," she was saying essentially what Justice Powell
said - that even as government acknowledges that race matters, it should
not assume that other attributes do not. In the education setting, those other
attributes might be test scores, undergraduate or high school performance,
musical or athletic talent, geographic and socioeconomic background, per-
sonal essays, references, etc. - what we might call "traditional admissions
criteria." In the voting setting, the traditional districting criteria that cannot
be entirely displaced by race would include political party, socioeconomic
background, education level, religion, etc. Justice O'Connor, then, appears
to have articulated a vision similar to Justice Powell's - which we might
call a commitment to look at the "whole person" - on a consistent basis.
So when she voted to approve a narrow race-conscious redistricting plan
just two Terms ago in Easley v. Cromartie12 because the plan respected the
"whole person" principle, some proponents of the University of Michigan
Law School plan took heart.
By characterizing education as political, rather than just economic,
Justice O'Connor tapped into a deep vein of Supreme Court decisions in-
volving voting, jury service and other political arenas in which the Court
has been especially sensitive to the actual - and not just hypothetical - in-
clusion of minority groups, with the redistricting cases being just one ex-
ample. And this political characterization of law schools also may explain
why the Court's opinion so readily dismisses the suggestion of the Solicitor
General and Justice Scalia that the admissions policy was not narrowly ta i-
lored because law schools can pursue diversity without using race simply
by lowering their academic standards. Justice Scalia's factual assumption
is highly problematic. But more centrally, for Justice O'Connor and the
Court, putting competitive law schools to this Hobson's choice would serve
only to hurt the Republic.13 In light of this extensive backdrop, and Justice
11. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
12. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
13. That Justice Scalia's reasoning here did not resonate at all with the major-
ity highlights certain facets of the litigation that made it a particularly sympathetic
vehicle for supporters of race-based affirmative action. Not only were plaintiffs
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O'Connor's key role in creating it, we have little doubt that Justice
O'Connor really does believe that having people of all races in competitive
law schools is a very important and admirable objective - "compelling" in
doctrinal terms.
Given that she thinks diversity, including and perhaps especially racial
diversity, in important civic institutions is a compelling state interest to
pursue, the view we ascribe t her here - that affirmative action needs a
temporal stopping point - must really be intended to focus on the govern-
ment's means, not its laudable end. In other words, our hypothesized pos i-
tion of Justice O'Connor must be that individualized race consciousness -
even when deployed in service of the very worthy goal of promoting diver-
sity - itself works sufficient constitutional injury that it cannot be continued
indefinitely. But locating one's discomfort with the means rather than the
end itself still raises questions. For it is still not clear why, if one thinks
that individualistic racial consciousness is a problematic or at least subop-
timal means to accomplish a laudable goal, she would endorse those means
for 25 years, but not beyond. If race consciousness is permissible now,
why not forever; and if not permissible later, why is it OK to use now? To
put the point slightly differently, again assuming that the key facts remain
unchanged, why should Justice O'Connor's or anyone else's reading or ap-
plication of the Fourteenth Amendment change over the next 25 years?
The oddity we see in the notion of such a doctrinal sunset is perhaps
best illustrated by a timeline that describes Justice O'Connor's hypothe-
sized votes in cases that would arise over the course of 50 years. Suppose
Justice O'Connor would decide the Grutter question at various points in
time (denoted here as "T") in the following ways: (a) at T = 1978, when the
matter first arose in Bakke, Justice O'Connor would have disapproved and
disallowed what she calls "racial preferences" as a means of attaining d-
challenging a program at a law school - which is inherently a more political setting
than, say, a graduate physics department - they were challenging a law school that
produces leaders and that needs racial preferences right now to accomplish any
meaningful racial diversity. Indeed, if plaintiffs had prevailed, the resulting invali-
dation of race-based affirmative action would have affected not just very competi-
tive public law schools like the University of California's law schools and the Uni-
versity of Michigan, but also all very competitive private law schools as well,
because plaintiffs included a Title VI claim. We are not saying, of course, that
Grutter's holding is limited to top tier law schools - recall the cases after Brown
that reflexively invalidated racial segregation in settings very different than educa-
tion, see, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (involving city buses); Bal-
timore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (involving public beaches); Holmes v.
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (involving a municipal golf course) - but much of
Grutter's reasoning and explanation seems focused on admissions problems facing
competitive law schools.
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versity; (b) at T = 2003, Justice O'Connor permitted racial preferences as a
means of attaining diversity; (c) at T = 2028, Justice O'Connor would re-
ject racial preferences as a means of attaining diversity. This timeline, of
course, begs the following questions: Given (a), how can we explain (b)?
And if we can somehow explain (b) after (a) - as we try to do below by
reference to reliance interests - why wouldn't this reliance explanation
carry over and dictate an opposite result in (c)? We address these two
questions in turn.
I. RELIANCE
First, as to how Justice O'Connor could conceivably reject race con-
sciousness were she on the Court in 1978 when Bakke was decided and yet
vote to allow "racial preferences" 25 years later in Grutter, one possible
explanation is some variant of a stare decisis-type argument. Justice Tho-
mas' partial dissent in Grutter plainly anticipates that the majority would
try to ground its decision on the doctrine of precedent. As he writes, "one
might expect the Court to fall back on the judicial policy of stare decisis.,
4
But, he goes on to write, "the Court eschews ... this ... defense of its
holding."15
To our minds, the Court does, and it does not. On the cie hand, Jus-
tice O'Connor purports not to engage the debate (waged in the Sixth Cir-
cuit below and in other Circuits) over whether Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke embracing race-conscious means of obtaining diversity constitutes
binding Supreme Court authority: "We do not find it necessary to decide
[that question because] today we endorse Justice Powell's view that student
body diversity is a compelling interest."' 6
But on the other hand, Justice O'Connor begins her discussion of the
issues in Grutter by recalling Bakke and then observing:
Since this Court's splintered decision in Bakke, Justice Powell's
opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has served as the
touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions
policies. Public and private universities across the Nation have mod-
eled their own admissions programs on Justice Powell's views on
permissible race-conscious policies. We therefore discuss Justice
Powell's opinion in some detail. 17
14. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 350 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 330 (majority opinion).
17. Id. at 328-29 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
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The "therefore" in Justice O'Connor's punchline sentence strongly
suggests that the twenty-five year history of reliance by the public and pri-
vate universities matters in the way the Court structures its opinion and
analysis. It seems to count a great deal to Justice O'Connor that society has
come to know and accept Powell's approach in Bakke. 8 Along with
Brown,' 9 Roe,20 and Miranda,2 Bakke is one of those cases, and labels, that
has made the leap from the legal doctrine world to the real world.
The centrality of Justice Powell's Bakke opinion is further illustrated
by how tightly Justice O'Connor's writing in Grutter tracks not only Pow-
ell's reasoning, but also his exact language. Even putting aside the part of
the Grutter opinion before the Court said it was endorsing Powell's ap-
proach, Justice O'Connor quoted extensively from Justice Powell a whop-
ping sixteen times. To endorse and cite a case and suggest independent
agreement with it is one thing; to cannibalize all its key formulations sug-
gests that the case is doing a great deal of the work. Powell's words them-
selves, and not just the ideas they convey, are what admissions offices built
their programs around, and thus they are what Justice O'Connor builds her
opinion around.
Of course, reliance interests and the dislocation costs of a reversal in
judicial direction can be asserted in virtually any important case; the Court
(and Justice O'Connor) usually decides cases based on these considerations
only when they are unusually substantial. The question is thus posed: why
would Justice O'Connor find the dislocation costs particularly substantial
in this context? It cannot be because the University of Michigan Law
School or other law schools would confront insurmountable logistical ob-
stacles in eradicating race consciousness from their admissions policies.
That could be accomplished with the stroke of a pen and a simple injunc-
tion issued to admissions officers: "don't consider race." Indeed, the logis-
tical problems that arise when trying to change admissions programs did
18. Indeed, it seems to count a great deal to other members of the Grutter ma-
jority as well. In a piece written for the Legal Times, Supreme Court reporter
Tony Mauro related the contents of Justice Stevens' personal notes from the Con-
ference at which the Court discussed the merits of the Michigan cases. According
to the notes, Justice Stevens' "leading point, and a crucial one, was to buttress the
precedential value of Justice Lewis Powell Jr.'s concurrence" in Bakke. According
to Mauro, Stevens "said he urged that the Court not undertake a 'technical analy-
sis' of the stare decisis value of Powell's writing in the case but instead consider
'the extent of reliance' on Powell's view by major institutions ever since." Tony
Mauro, "Gearing Up for the New Term," LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 6, 2003, at 9.
19. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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not appear to give Justice O'Connor (or the rest of the Court majority) any
pause in invalidating the University of Michigan's undergraduate admis-
22
sions policy in Grutter's companion case, Gratz.
Nor can the extraordinary dislocation costs be described as the diffi-
culties that future admissions applicants would face in adjusting their be-
havior and decision-making in light of revamped admissions possibilities.
Similar private sector adjustment to changing rules has not stopped the
Court - including Justice O'Connor - from revamping the world of rem-
edy-based affirmative action programs in cases like Croson23 and Ada-
rand.24 So, what are the dislocation costs that might have given Justice
O'Connor pause as she considered abruptly jettisoning the Bakke frame-
work?
In Grutter, we speculate, Justice O'Connor was somewhat uncomfort-
able with using race-conscious admissions decisions to attain the compe l-
ling goal of racial diversity in higher education. But at the same time, we
surmise, she was worried that an abrupt about-face (rather than gradual
weaning) from Bakke would immediately, openly and notoriously undo the
country's recent progress towards a more integrated society. Justice
O'Connor notes, for example, that other states have recently been engaged
in race-neutral experimentation, and that states like Michigan "can and
should draw on the most promising aspects of these race-neutral alterna-
tives as they develop. '25 But she knows that because everyone has taken
Bakke as his guide, these experiments are not nearly as far along as they
would have been had the Court foreclosed race consciousness in 1978.
Thus, society today is not as far along the road to finding effective race-
neutral means of accomplishing racial diversity as it would have been (as-
suming such effective means exist). Indeed, one of the most prominent re-
cent experiments - the University of Texas' so-called "10% plan"
came about only because the Fifth Circuit in the well-known Hopwooad6
case had rejected Bakke as a plausible basis for the University's race-
conscious affirmative action plan. The 10% plan has itself involved much
dislocation cost in Texas, and is itself a plausible response to Hopwood
only by virtue of the unique demographics in Texas. Justice O'Connor
could understandably not want to impose a Hopwood-like shock on the rest
22. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
23. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
24. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
25. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003).
26. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
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of the country.27
Today, then, unlike in 1978 when the experiment with affirmative ac-
tion was just beginning, a cold-turkey disestablishment of race-conscious
programs would lead to a stark and highly visible resegregation of higher
education, with a likely delayed effect being the resegregation of public
and private sector leadership positions. Whether or not Justice O'Connor
would have embraced Justice Powell's approval of explicitly race-
conscious programs in 1978, the situation to her in 2003 was different.
II. WHENCE THE SUNSET?
So far so good. But all of this raises a follow-up question: if the ends
are compelling, and if the means - even if not constitutionally optimal -
must be tolerated essentially to avoid dislocation costs, what sense would it
make for Justice O'Connor to include the twenty-five year "sunset provi-
sion"? After all, in other settings where reliance interests are formally ac-
knowledged as doing the work, rather than (as we speculate in Grutter)
simply behind the scenes providing some explanatory power, the Court has
not typically provided any sunset language. Take, for example, perhaps the
most important modem case where reliance and dislocation costs seem to
explain the Court's decision to stick with an approach some of the Justices
appear to think is wrong as a matter of constitutional first principle -
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.28 There, the plurality opinion (joined by
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter) observed that "for two decades of
economic and social dvelopments, people have organized intimate rea-
tionships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their
places in society in reliance on the availability of abortion., 29 This is simi-
lar language to Grutter's: "[s]ince ... Bakke [twenty-five years ago] ....
public and private universities across the nation have modeled their own
admissions programs on Justice Powell's views on permissible race-
conscious policies."3 ° But at the end of Casey, there was no suggestion of-
fered in the opinion that parents should tell the next generation of young
adults not to grow up counting on Roe, and that the protection of the right
in Casey was good only for the generation who had already relied on it.
In Grutter, unlike Casey, Justice O'Connor seems to want to structure
a constitutional transition period, i.e., she's using the next quarter century
27. Cf Mauro, supra note 18 (observing Justice Stevens' fear about the conse-
quences of a "sea change" that would be produced by judicial invalidation of the
Michigan Law School plan).
28. 510 U.S. 833 (1994).
29. Id. at 856.
30. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-29.
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as a planned transition to what she perceives to be a constitutionally prefer-
able state of affairs. Her embrace of diversity as a compelling state interest
seems candid and whole -hearted, but her willingness to countenance eX-
plicit race-conscious action as a means to effectuate that interest seems ten-
tative, presumably because of some constitutional injury she believes race
consciousness inflicts. She appears unwilling to cut off such race con-
sciousness cold turkey for reasons we've explained, but she wants by
means of legal doctrine to bring society around to the point where soon we
no longer need it. So she self-consciously approaches the next twenty-five
years willing to tolerate a transitional state of constitutional affairs as we
move slowly from where we are today to a state she would prefer, where
we use means other than race consciousness to attain the desirable diversity
(if any affirmative means remain necessary at all).
One might immediately wonder how such a motivation/mindset is
permissible for a Justice to have. Traditionally, judicial power exists so
that judges can say what the law is now - "jurisdiction" is, after all, the
power to "say the law" - rather than so judges can "make" law by declaring
that it is was once one thing (in 1978), will now be a new thing (in 2003),
and will be something else again in the future (2028). It is of course true
that all judicial dicta in opinions tries to give litigants and lawyers some
guidance about future cases, but usually dicta is intended to advise about
how the law as it is today would apply to situations not yet before the court.
Justice O'Connor's closing comment is - under our hypothesis - not about
how today's law would apply tomorrow, but rather about how today's law
may change tomorrow, and is thus jurisprudentially unusual.3 In addition
to this large jurisprudential question, Justice O'Connor's transitional mind-
set also implicates the unique constitutional treatment of the race question.
We briefly take up both of these issues.
First, as to whether judges ought to be "making" law by declaring
what the law would have been in the past and will be in the future rather
than simply stating what it i today, we note that the issues are very com-
plicated. In a line of cases culminating in James B. Beam Distilling Com-
pany v. Georgia ,32 the Court grappled with this jurisprudential question in
considering the retroactivity of its rulings. In that case, the majority said
that when the Court announces a ruling, call it ruling "X," even if ruling X
31. Our hypothesized meaning of Justice O'Connor's comment is different, of
course, from statements, like that of Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 579-80 (1985), to the
effect that changed membership on the Court will lead it later to embrace what a
dissenter thinks is the correct reading of the law at the time of the dissent.
32. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
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changes the status quo, the proper understanding is that ruling X was al-
ways the law (whether or not we realized it before), and that nothing has
changed other than our awareness of what the law is. This suggests that
judges are supposed to just say what the law "is now" and assume it always
was and always will be so. Justice O'Connor's Grutter approach appears
to be out of line with this understanding.
This essay is not, of course, the place or time fully to engage that ju-
risprudential debate. All we want to do here is note that Justice O'Connor
dissented in James B. Beam, and in other contexts as well has seemed to
embrace a self-conscious understanding of the judicial role that allows for
the conceptual possibility of "transitional" rulings. For example, in Ameri-
can Trucking Associations v. Smith33 in the early 1990s, she took the posi-
tion that courts can take into account the "newness" of a ruling as a reason
for denying relief to a claimant who should win under the new ruling but
won't because that would unfairly disrupt reliance interests.34 In other
words, she said in effect: "Ruling X, reached today, is the right ruling, but
we cannot implement ruling X yet for reliance reasons." Her approach in
Grutter might represent the flip-side of the American Trucking coin. In es-
sence, in Grutter, she might be read to be suggesting: "Today we recognize
that Bakke is no longer good law, but implementing this immediately
would have unacceptable societal dislocation costs, so I will grandfather in
currently existing programs similar to those embraced by Justice Powell for
twenty-five years and then it's all over." Put differently, there is but a fine
line between saying, "Today the law is X but tomorrow the law will be Y,"
and saying, "Today the law is Y but we will delay rnplementing that law
until tomorrow."
Of course Justice O'Connor did not put things in these latter words,
perhaps because such a formulation sounds particularly legislative in nature
- "the law really is X, but I will delay implementation of X for a period of
time." But it is worth noting that Justice O'Connor has, at least once be-
fore, explicitly embraced such transitional reasoning and transitional lan-
guage. In Northern Pipeline Construction Company v. Marathon Pipe Line
Company, 5 she joined part of an opinion that effectively said: "The Act at
issue is unconstitutional, but because of the government's reliance interests,
we apply our ruling today only prospectively. More than that, we will stay
our ruling for four months, during which time the unconstitutional Act con-
tinues to govern, so that the government has time to figure out how to ac-
33. 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
34. Related but distinct questions arise in the context of retroactive application
of criminal procedure decisions in the context of federal habeas review.
35. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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complish its goals through alternative, constitutionally permissible,
means." That opinion in Northern Pipeline is open to criticism as being
too legislative, which might explain why Justice O'Connor would have
adopted the alternative form here in Grutter - "race conscious affirmative
action is permissible now, but only for 25 years" rather than copy Northern
Pipeline's delayed injunction format ("race-conscious affirmative action is
impermissible, but I'll give you 25 years to transition away from it.").
Whatever the arguments in favor of or against judicial transitioning, if
you will, we must observe that the vexing problem of race and race con-
sciousness in American history has featured at least a couple of creative -
and not particularly defensible or attractive - transition-like moves at cru-
cial moments. Consider first the U.S. Constitution's own treatment of the
problem of slavery in 1787. The original constitutional text had an anoma-
lous sunset provision, dealing with (although not mentioning) race. That
provision accepted a practice that was morally troubling for a period of
years, as a matter of transition from a bad place to a good place without too
great dislocation costs (as viewed by society at the time). We are speaking,
of course, of the twenty-year immunity from federal legislative interference
that slave importation enjoyed under Article I, section 9.36
And here's another troubling racial transition analogy - the decision
by the Supreme Court in the second Brown v. Board of Education (Brown
M/)
37 decision not to require immediate desegregation but rather to insist
upon compliance with the earlier Brown mandate only with "all deliberate
speed" - a term that has been criticized as countenancing Southern defiance
of federal judicial authority. One way to understand Brown II is that the
Court basically said: "The state of affairs today is impermissible, so you
must change, but do so in a way that is responsive to dislocation costs."
Opponents of race-based affirmative action today could make the
same criticism of the approach we hypothesize Justice O'Connor to have
taken in Grutter as was made of the Court about its Brown II ruling. If
race-conscious affirmative action is constitutionally problematic today,
why should we provide a twenty-five year transition window? Why not re-
quire disestablishment of these programs now, immediately? A quick re-
sponse to this criticism - and one that distinguishes Justice O'Connor's
Grutter approach from Brown II or Article I, section 9, even assuming she
is constitutionally uncomfortable with race-conscious means - is that there
is, according to Justice O'Connor, a compelling state interest in accom-
plishing racial diversity in education. There is no similarly compelling in-
terest in avoiding racial diversity and integration in education. Being sensi-
36. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
37. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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tive to dislocation costs in a manner that sustains achievement of a laudable
goal is different - both morally and legally - than taking into account dis-
location costs in a manner that perpetuates injustice solely to mollify un-
worthy public and private sentiments.
One final distinction - this one between Grutter and Casey - may also
be worth flagging. In Casey, as we observed, the centrist plurality of which
Justice O'Connor was a part did not try to transition the world towards one
in which abortion could be banned a few decades from now, even though
perhaps the three Justices who joined the centrist opinion might believe, as
a matter of first constitutional principle, that Roe was wrongly decided. In
Casey, that is, the reliance interests of those who had grown up around Roe
were strong enough to preserve Roe - or what the plurality called the es-
sence of Roe - forever. But in Casey, the reliance was a reliance on the ex-
istence of an individual right. In Grutter (as in Northern Pipeline and
James B. Beam), by contrast, the reliance has been reliance by government
(and private) school admissions offices, in exercising powers. Perhaps
where government's exercise of powers - as opposed to individuals' exer-
cise of rights - is the subject of the reliance, our hypothesized Justice
O'Connor and others might feel a transition approach is more plausible.
HI. CONCLUSION
It has become commonplace for the meanings of the Constitution ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court to change over time. Sometimes this Cc-
curs because of changing Court membership, and sometimes this occurs
because individual Justices' positions change over time. But it is a rarity,
to say the least, for a Justice to announce an individual change of position
in advance - in essence proclaiming that the Constitution means X now but
will soon mean Y (even assuming no material changes in the relevant facts
about the world). While Congress occasionally enacts sunset provisions
into its work product, the Supreme Court usually does not. That's why Jus-
tice O'Connor's provocative reference to such a doctrinal sunset provision
in Grutter invites inquiry.
We reiterate that Justice O'Connor's reference was ambiguous, and
we intentionally embrace arguendo the sunsetting interpretation (as against
other possible interpretations) as a heuristic to set up the intriguing juris-
prudential questions raised by the notion of a doctrinal sunset. But Justice
O'Connor and some of her colleagues have embraced an equivalent move
at least once before, albeit for several months rather than decades. And we
do believe that, whether this represents Justice O'Connor's view or not,
others have expressed the sentiment that race-conscious admissions pro-
grams should be approved today only as limited-duration measures, and
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then terminated whether the underlying factual justifications change or not.
So we believe it is worth underscoring this potential reading of Grutter's
sunsetting language, as well as suggesting that it invites further inquiry into
the legitimacy of announcing in advance a doctrinal sunset as a matter of
constitutional interpretation.
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